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ARTICLES
Development Assistance - A Tool of Foreign
Policy*
by Lynne Dratler Finney**
I. INTRODUCTION
F oreign assistance is one of the United States' most potent foreign
policy tools. The focus of American aid to foreign countries reflects, as
it always has, national political and economic philosophies and objectives.
One of the primary objectives has always been and continues to be hu-
manitarian. As President John F. Kennedy said in his message to Con-
gress on the subject of foreign aid, the United States has:
[M]oral obligations as a wise leader and good neighbor in the interdepen-
dent community of free nations - our economic obligations as the wealth-
iest people in a world of largely poor people, as a nation no longer depen-
dent upon the loans from abroad that once helped us develop our own
economy - and our political obligations as the single largest counter to
the adversaries of freedom.'
However, another purpose of our program of foreign assistance is the
maintenance of political and economic stability throughout the world.
Underlying this objective is the pervasive philosophy that such stability
can only be achieved through political and economic freedom, reflecting
the democracy upon which our country is founded. All of these considera-
tions and many others govern our policy of foreign assistance. It is signifi-
cant that our foreign assistance objectives are so basic that they have
changed very little from one administration to another, although certain
* This article, submitted in January 1982, represents the views of the author; it does
not necessarily represent the views of the Agency for International Development or the U.S.
Government. Prior to publication this article was cleared by A.I.D.
** Attorney-Advisor for Agency for International Development, General Counsel's Of-
fice and U.N. Policy Advisor for the Agency in 1982.
1 Message of the President to the Congress on the Subject of Foreign Aid (Mar. 22,
1961), reprinted in WHY FOREIGN Am? 3 (R. Goldwin ed. 1962).
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emphases vary.
This article will explore our present philosophies and policies of for-
eign aid as reflected in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended,2
(hereinafter FAA) and various other statutes, regulations and internal
policies currently pursued by the Agency for International Development
(A.I.D.). Foreign assistance takes a variety of forms, multilateral -
through agencies of the United Nations, the World Bank, etc. - and bi-
lateral, which is direct assistance from the United States to another coun-
try or group of countries. The United States provides a number of types
of economic bilateral assistance, such as economic support funds, which
provide primarily balance of payment support although some projects are
included; food assistance, such as that provided by Public Law 480; dis-
aster relief; Peace Corps programs; Overseas Private Investment Coopera-
tion insurance and guarantees; and development assistance, which covers
technical assistance, housing guarantees, loans and grants to underdevel-
oped countries for non-military purposes. It is this last type of bilateral
assistance, development assistance, which is the subject of this article.
The first part of this article will review those sections of the FAA and
other statutes and regulations which reflect basic American political and
economic philosophies as applied to aid programs and projects. The sec-
ond part of this article will cover statutory and regulatory prohibitions on
American foreign assistance which prevent funds from going to countries
which do not conform to our philosophies, and where it is not in the best
interest of the United States to support political or economic philosophies
of other countries. The final part analyzes the concept of "policy dia-
logue" which is the method used by A.I.D. to change the policies of recip-
ient countries in order to make the development process more effective.
This section includes a case study of application of the "policy dialogue"
concept to A.I.D.'s housing guarantee program in Israel.I
II. BASIC UNITED STATES DEVELOPMENT AsSISTANCE POLICIES
The primary policies underlying the U.S! foreign assistance program
are humanitarian, political and economic. These policies have been codi-
fied over the years in the FAA and have formed the basis of the U.S.
foreign aid program, although the emphasis on each of the three policies
has changed during various administrations. The main focus of the U.S.
2 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1976).
' Pub. L. No. 480 is the Food for Peace Program established by the Agricultural Trade
Development and Assistance Act of 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-480, 68 Stat. 454 (1954). The pro-
gram consists of Title I, concessional sales of agricultural commodities on credit terms for
foreign currencies; Title II, donations of agricultural commodities, and Title ]I, the food for
development program under which funds accruing from the local sales of commodities are
used for development. See A.I.D. HANDBOOK, Vol. 9.
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foreign aid program is stated to be humanitarian. The first section of Part
I of the FAA reaffirms the traditional humanitarian ideals of the Ameri-
can people, and renews our commitment to assist developing countries to
eliminate hunger, poverty, illness and ignorance.4 Congress has declared
that the "principal purpose of United States bilateral development assis-
tance is to help the poor majority of people in developing countries to
participate in a process of equitable growth through productive work and
to influence decisions that shape their lives, with the goal of increasing
their incomes and their access to public services which will enable them
to satisfy their basic needs and live lives of decency, dignity, and hope." 5
Our foreign policy has always reflected a concern for humanitarian goals
and a sincere desire to help other nations attain our level of development
and freedom. This concern has increased, rather than abated, over the
years, and has been reflected through Congressional mandates in amend-
ments to the Foreign Assistance Act.
A. Humanitarian Aspects of Foreign Assistance Programs
Although the first American assistance programs were largely moti-
vated by political concerns, the humanitarian aspects of our program
quickly became more prominent. The first American foreign aid program
was targeted for Greece and Turkey in 1947.6 Its basic purpose was to
help Greece quash the guerrilla rebellion, which if successful, would have
delivered Greece into the hands of the Communists. Our aid to Turkey
was designed to strengthen military forces in order to prevent a possible
attack by the Communists on Turkey in an effort to gain control of the
outlet to the Black Sea. The popular concept of foreign aid was first es-
tablished by the Marshall Plan, which originated in 1948 as a program of
economic aid for the reconstruction of Europe. Both the original program
and the Marshall Plan were extremely successful because they focused on
reviving, rather than creating, previously developed economies and
cultures.
More recent foreign aid programs have focused on less developed
countries. Over the past several decades, our aid has encompassed the
developing world and we have confronted a multitude of new develop-
ment challenges, including a total absence of physical infrastructure, eco-
nomic management, technology and development tools within many re-
cipient countries. The task that our country has undertaken is frankly
formidable.7 We now provide development assistance and economic sup-
' 22 U.S.C. § 2151(a) (1976).
22 U.S.C. § 2151-1(a) (1976).
See Sulzberger, Foreign Affairs: Where It All Began, N.Y. Times, Aug. 28, 1968, at
46, col 5.
1 AGENCY FOR INT'L DEVELOPMENT, 1982 ANNuAL REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DE-
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port fund assistance to 76 countries.8
American humanitarian concerns have created an enormous chal-
lenge for us in trying to assist so many countries and cultures. A.I.D. has
searched for effective solutions to a multiplicity of development problems
through the process of trial and error. During the 1950's and 1960's, the
basic development approach at A.I.D. was based on what some critics
have termed the "trickle down" theory, which posited that if large-scale
capital intensive projects, such as dams, railroads and highways, were cre-
ated to strengthen industry and government in developing countries, the
benefits of such projects - jobs, food, education and higher incomes -
would inevitably "trickle down" to the poorest people in those countries.
While some benefits resulted to the developing countries as a result of
this type of assistance, it soon became clear that the major benefits did
not in fact inure to the poorer people. Experts now agree it is equally
important to improve the distribution of assistance to the poor."
Congressional recognition that the large-scale capital transfers which
were then the primary strategies in our bilateral assistance efforts were
not effective in reaching the world's poor majority led to a rejection of the
"trickle down" approach. In 1973, Congress amended the Foreign Assis-
tance Act to focus aid priorities expressly on the poor.10 These changes
came to be known as the "New Directions" for development assistance
and evolved into the "basic human needs" strategy which continues to
dominate the foreign aid program today.
The Foreign Assistance Act of 1973 provided specific guidelines for
the Agency for International Development on meeting basic human
needs:
(1) Bilateral development aid should concentrate'increasingly on
sharing American technical expertise, farm commodities, and industrial
goods to meet critical development problems, and less on large-scale cap-
ital transfers, which when made should be in association with contribu-
tions from other industrialized countries working together in a multilat-
eral framework.
(2) Future United States bilateral support for development should
focus on critical problems in those functional sectors which affect the
lives of the majority of the people in the developing countries: food pro-
duction, rural development and nutrition; population planning and
VELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITTEE: DEVELOPMENT IssuEs, at 43.
8 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION: FISCAL YEAR
1982, at 8 (Main Volume, amended version).
9 H.R. REP. No. 388, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. note o, at 15 (1973), where Congress found
that although the industrial sectors of developing countries benefited from U.S. bilateral
economic assistance, such assistance had not helped the majority of the poorest people.
10 Legislative Development, Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus.
925, 927-8 (1974).
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health; and education, public administration and human resource
development."
The new focus on basic human needs and the delineation of specific
sectors of development assistance increased the humanitarian emphasis of
the program. In addition, the 1973 Act addressed another humanitarian
concern, disaster relief. Although A.I.D. had previously implemented
projects for victims of catastrophe under a contingency fund, the 1973
amendments for the first time appropriated funds "primarily for disaster
relief purposes," and required that they be used for those purposes.1 2 At
the same time, Congress inserted the first provisions for disaster relief in
specific areas, in the Sahel in West Africa, in the flooded areas of Paki-
stan, and in the earthquake-damaged portions of Nicaragua. More recent
amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act and Foreign Assistance Ap-
propriations legislation have engendered a proliferation of specific provi-
sions for designated areas of assistance, which has reduced the Agency's
flexibility to make decisions on budget allocations among countries.
B. Political Considerations in Foreign Assistance Programs
Although it is clear that our foreign assistance program has a sub-
stantial humanitarian aspect, it is equally clear that our program is also
designed to serve our political interests. In this case, a distinction must be
made between short-term and long-term political interests. Financial as-
sistance to a country may be based on short-term political considerations
such as helping a country quash an insurrection, as was the case with the
early U.S. aid program in Greece. On the other hand, allocations of for-
eign assistance funds to countries may be based on longer-term interests
such as promoting the development of democratic institutions in a coun-
try in order to insure that the country will remain in or gain entry to the
free world. This longer-term type of development is known as "political
development." The strongest statement of our philosophy of political de-
velopment is set forth in Title IX, entitled "Utilization of Democratic In-
stitutions in Development."1 3 Title IX provides: "In carrying our pro-
grams authorized in this chapter and chapter 1 [our basic foreign
assistance program] emphasis shall be placed on assuring maximum par-
ticipation in the task of economic development on the part of the people
of the developing countries, through the encouragement of democratic
22 U.S.C. § 2151(b)(1) and (2) (1976).
1 Legislative Development, supra note 10, at 939.
,3 22 U.S.C. § 2218 (1976). See an excellent analysis of this section in Butler, Title IX
of the Foreign Assistance Act: Foreign Aid and Political Development, 3 LAw & Soc. Rv.
115 (Aug. 1968).
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private and local government institutions."'14
The proponents of Title IX wanted U.S. development assistance to
focus on building the kinds of political and social institutions that would
enhance economic development and effective self-government. Congress-
man Donald M. Frazier, who introduced the legislation, asserted that the
United States should emphasize economic aid, and "go forward with a
massive program of political development activities .... "I Title IX was
intended to foster democratic values and to encourage the growth of po-
litical power at the local level which would hopefully result in the evolu-
tion of democratic, pluralistic societies. Title IX also provided specifically
for support of "civic education and training in skills required for effective
participation in governmental and political processes essential to self
government."' 6
Following the enactment of Title IX, A.I.D. recognized that it could
not attempt a wholesale transfer of American democratic institutions to
recipient countries and stated, in its report to Congress, that it would
take a flexible approach to implementing Title IX.17 However, A.I.D. has
acknowledged that participation at the local level is essential to the suc-
cess of assistance projects. Thus, projects subsequent to 1967 may have
had an increased emphasis on self-help and participation at the local
level, but A.I.D. has, at the same time, avoided overly politicizing its
projects. As administrations have come and gone, various countries have
changed their status in an endless popularity contest to obtain U.S. aid.
But the cadre of technical experts at A.I.D. has steadfastly continued to
develop projects in their areas of special expertise in agriculture, health,
nutrition and education, deemphasizing current political concerns.
While A.I.D. has trained many foreign nationals who have later be-
come political leaders, the focus has not been on "training political lead-
ers" but on training a corps of technical experts who can effectively ad-
minister the development assistance provided by the United States and
other donors and who can form a governmental structure which is able to
promote effective economic development. A.I.D. has found it far more im-
portant to train administrators for basic health programs and teachers
and teacher trainers for primary education programs than to train politi-
cal leaders. The United States has also provided grants to local and re-
gional organizations, such as the African Development Bank and the Eco-
nomic Community for Africa, which will help strengthen the participating
countries' abilities to provide for their own development. Such grants are
14 22 U.S.C. § 2218(a) (1976).
15 112 CONG. REc. 14,765-67 (1966).
16 22 U.S.C. § 2218(b)(3) (1976).
17 AGENCY FOR INT'L DEVELOPMENT, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
TrrLE IX, app. (May 10, 1967).
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"political" only in that they train officials of developing countries to work
within a peaceful international framework and establish an internal ca-
pacity for making effective use of funds for their growing development.
A few A.I.D. funded projects fit directly within the mandate of Title
IX and are overtly "political" in nature. A.I.D. provides grants for AFL-
CIO projects throughout Latin America, 8 Asia19 and Africa" for organiz-
ing labor unions and educating labor union leaders. The creation of labor
unions is seen as a first step toward encouraging democracy.
An even more direct effort to promote democracy abroad is the re-
cently created "Democracy Project," chaired by U.S. Trade Representa-
tive William E. Brock, III. The Executive Board will include the national
chairmen of the Democratic and Republican parties, and Senators and
other political luminaries from both parties. This is a major bipartisan
initiative to support democratic institutions, parties and movements
throughout the world. This project will be the first effort to address trans-
national involvement of American political parties. A.I.D. has provided a
$150,000 grant for start-up expenses in fiscal year 1983.21
The Project has recommended the establishment of a "National En-
dowment for Democracy" which will be financed by Congress. Legislation
has passed Committee and is pending in both Houses of Congress to es-
tablish and fund the Endowment. The Endowment will fund specific
projects through the Democratic and Republican Parties, the AFL-CIO
and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Projects will be designed as direct
incentives to encourage recipient countries to adopt the American form of
democracy.22
1. Encouragement of Private Enterprise
Other sections of our foreign assistance legislation also reflect basic
attitudes and values inherent in our national philosophy. One of the key
sections in the Foreign Assistance Act which has been reemphasized dur-
ing the present administration is Section 601 which encourages free enter-
prise and private participation. Section 601 states:
The Congress of the United States recognizes the vital role of free enter-
prise in achieving rising levels of production standards of living essential
to economic progress and development. Accordingly, it is declared to be
the policy of the United States to encourage the efforts of other countries
11 $8,000,000 for FY 83. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEVELOPMENT, CONGRESSIONAL PRESENTATION
FIscAL YEAR 1983, at 387 (Main Volume).
19 $4,000,000 for FY 83. Id. at 327.
20 $3,000,000 for FY 83. Id. at 285.
21 A.I.D. Grant No. OTR-0098-G-SS-3029-00, FY 83.
22 S. 1342, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983); H.&. 130, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983).
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to increase the flow of international trade, to foster private initiative and
competition, to encourage the development and use of cooperatives,
credit unions, and savings and loan associations, to discourage monopo-
listic practices, to improve the technical efficiency of their industry, agri-
culture, and commerce, and to strengthen free labor unions; and to en-
courage the contribution of United States enterprise toward economic
strength of less developed friendly countries, through private trade and
investment abroad, private participation in programs carried out under
this Act (including the use of private trade channels to the maximum
extent practicable in carrying out such programs), and exchange of ideas
and technical information on the matters covered by this subsection.2 3
This section recognizes that private enterprise can be promoted in
two ways: by encouraging the creation of indigenous businesses and by
direct American private investment in developing countries. Both types
of projects have been implemented by A.I.D. throughout the developing
world.
The importance of private investment in the foreign assistance effort
has been recognized throughout the history of our foreign assistance pro-
gram.24 The capital required by developing countries far exceeds what the
United States and other donor governments contribute as foreign assis-
tance; therefore, private investment must be encouraged to provide as
much of the difference as possible.2 5 Since the early 1950's, the United
States has encouraged the participation of private investment in develop-
ing countries as a means of accelerating their economic and social ad-
vancement. Numerous programs have been undertaken to mobilize the
resources of the private sector. For example, beginning with the 1948
Marshall Plan for the rehabilitation of Western Europe, the United
States has provided political risk insurance to encourage private U.S. in-
vestment abroad. By the late 1950's, the insurance program was re-
oriented to its present purpose of promoting U.S. private investment in
friendly less-developed countries and its coverage was expanded to in-
clude losses from expropriation and war, as well as currency inconvertibil-
ity. The insurance program used to be administered by the Agency for
International Development. However, in 1971, Congress created the Over-
seas Private Investment Corporation as an independent government cor-
poration which has expanded the coverage and scope of private invest-
ment insurance and guaranty programs.26
23 22 U.S.C. § 2351(a) (1961) (as amended).
24 See ADvisoRy COMMrrEE ON PRIvATE ENTERPRISE IN FOREIGN Am, REPORT ON FOR-
EIGN AID THROUGH PRIVATE INrrIATIvE (1965); COMMIrrr TO STRENGTHEN THE SECURITY OF
THE FREE WORLD, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE SCOPE AND DISTRIBUTION OF UNITED
STATES MILITARY AND ECONOMIc ASSISTANcE PROGRAMS (1963).
25 Cameron, The A.I.D. Housing Guaranty Program, 65 Nw. U.L. REV. 183 (1968).
28 See 22 U.S.C. § 2191-2200a (1976).
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In addition to the investment and guaranty programs, various initia-
tives to support private enterprise have been included in our bilateral as-
sistance program of grants and loans. During the 1960's and early 1970's,
A.I.D. had an office devoted to encouraging private enterprise to invest in
developing countries. In fact, the A.I.D. reorganization proposals which
President Nixon presented to Congress on September 15, 1970, empha-
sized the continued role of the private enterprise sector in development.27
During this period, A.I.D. had an extremely active private enterprise pro-
gram. The Bureau for Private Enterprise began to initiate a variety of
projects in several countries.
As part of its efforts to encourage private investment abroad, Con-
gress created a housing guaranty (HG) program to assist developing coun-
tries in obtaining resources for low-cost housing construction. 28 The hous-
ing guaranty program has been an outstanding success in mobilizing
financial resources in the United States to build shelter in developing
countries. Low cost housing projects were constructed throughout Latin
America, Asia and Israel. (A.I.D.'s Israeli Housing Guaranty Program is
analyzed in Section IV, Part C of this article.)
Despite some singular development successes, private enterprise pro-
grams were deemphasized in the mid 1970's after Congress rejected the
"trickle down" approach to development and redirected our foreign assis-
tance focus toward basic human needs. The Bureau for Private Enter-
prise was reorganized out of existence, and projects proliferated in basic
agriculture, health, education and population sectors. Of the private sec-
tor effort, basically only the housing guaranty program and a program for
the development of cooperatives continued with any real vigor.
Cooperatives are part of our heritage and their replication in devel-
oping countries has been supported by legislation. Cooperatives are as-
sociations whose members pool their resources to serve particular needs.
Membership is usually open, earnings are returned to members on the
basis of their participation in the business and each member has one vote
regardless of the number of shares owned. The success of American coop-
eratives, as evidenced by credit unions and agricultural and electric coop-
eratives, has created a constituency in Congress and throughout the
United States which supports them and encourages their replication in
developing countries. In 1973, Congress codified the philosophy of
217 AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEvELoPmENT, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE FOR THE SEVENTIES, PRESIDENT NIXON'S MESSAGE TO THE CONGRESS
(Sept. 15, 1970). These recommendations were based on a report of the Task Force on Inter-
national Development (Peterson Report), REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT FROM THE TASK FORCE
ON INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, UNrSD STATES FOREIGN ASSISTANCE IN THE 1970's: A NEW
APPROACH (Mar. 4, 1970).
- 22 U.S.C. § 2181-2182 (1976).
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prompting cooperatives by promulgating the following amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act:
In order to strengthen the participation of the rural and urban poor in
their country's development, high priority shall be given to increasing the
use of funds made available under this Act for technical and capital as-
sistance in the development and use of cooperatives in the less developed
countries which will enable and encourage greater numbers of the poor to
help themselves toward a better life.2 9
Under the authority of developing cooperatives, A.I.D. made techni-
cal assistance grants and loans on both a government-to-government basis
and also directly to recipient cooperative organizations, such as the Coop-
erative League of the U.S.A. (CLUSA) and the Credit Union National
Association, Inc. (CUNA).3 0
Aid was provided to finance rural electrification cooperatives in Peru
and the Philippines, to assist in financing agricultural credit cooperatives
in the Dominican Republic, and to make loans to affiliated savings and
loan associations in Panama. 1 Where these programs had the support of
the government and local groups, they succeeded spectacularly. However,
where the United States attempted to force them on a reluctant govern-
ment or on an economy which was not structured to accept them, such as
Israel, they failed. (See Section IV.) Another failure occurred in Senegal
where A.I.D. attempted to establish food cooperatives. The Government
of Senegal controlled the input and the output of the cooperatives, so
they were unable to operate independently or profitably. Despite some
failures, the basic concept of cooperatives has proven its worth and has
motivated self-help efforts of local organizations and encouraged the
growth of private enterprise throughout the ;developing world.
The present administration has reemphasized private enterprise
throughout the government and has resurrected the Bureau for Private
Enterprise at A.I.D. The current Administrator of A.I.D., Peter McPher-
son, has made private sector development one of his top priorities.32 The
thrust of the new effort is twofold: to encourage the United States private
sector to invest in developing countries and to develop indigenous private
enterprise within the developing countries themselves. The reorganized
Bureau is developing a variety of programs; a recent grant is to a
Women's World Banking project which will relend funds to small busi-
nesses owned by women in developing countries. The renewed emphasis
29 22 U.S.C. § 2151(i) (1976).
See Dublin, Foreign Assistance through Private Enterprise: A New Challenge to
United States Credit Unions and other Cooperatives, 6 J. INr'L LAw & EcON. 27, 29 (1971).
31 Id. at 32-33.
32 New U.S. Foreign Aid Director Sees Greater Role for Private Enterprise, Christian
Science Monitor, May 6, 1981.
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on the importance of the private sector in development reflects American
economic philosophy, as well as our historical development, which recog-
nizes individual initiative in private enterprise as the basis of our own
developed economy.
2. Special Assistance for Women's Programs
Women's issues have recently gained prominence and an amendment
reflecting this priority has been added to the Foreign Assistance Act. In
1973, Senator Charles Percy sponsored an amendment which focused on
women in developing countries. Until this amendment, foreign assistance
projects were designed primarily by men and were targeted toward tradi-
tionally male activities and needs, despite the fact that women are signifi-
cantly poorer than men in most developing countries.. The amendment
acknowledged that women in developing countries are a resource which
should not be neglected. The provision on women in development was
amended in 1977, and now states:
In recognition of the fact that women in developing countries play a
significant role in economic production, family support, and the overall
developmient process of the national economies of such countries, [this
part] shall be administered so as to give particular attention to those
programs, projects, and activities which tend to integrate women into the
national economies of developing countries, thus improving their status
and assisting the total development effort.3
Senator Percy insured that some emphasis would be placed on the
effort to help women in developing countries by providing special funding
for these programs. Under President Carter, a special office for Women in
Development was established at the Agency for International Develop-
ment. The Women in Development Office created programs designed to
institutionalize projects for women in our foreign assistance program and
funded studies to gather statistics and materials which would demon-
strate to recipient countries the benefits of integrating women into their
economies.
In many countries, for example, women are responsible for food pro-
duction for home consumption. By expanding agricultural training pro-
grams to include women, per capita food production could be increased,
child health would be improved and the family economy would improve
since excess food could be sold for additional income. The new office
designed and implemented projects for women which became models in
the development field and which began to be replicated within the geo-
graphic bureaus of A.I.D. The new programs were discussed at interna-
22 U.S.C. § 2151(k) (1976) (as amended Supp. V 1981).
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tional conferences and a network of persons interested in assisting women
was established in the developing world. These programs have also led to
a greater awareness on the part of both recipient governments and women
in developing countries of the availability of funds for women's activities
which has generated a greater demand for the funds.
The creation of programs for women, which has reflected our own
women's movement in the United States, is a striking example of the use
of foreign assistance to change the philosophies and values in recipient
countries. Although some governments are still reluctant to assert
women's rights because of religious or cultural beliefs, such as in some
Moslem countries, most countries are becoming persuaded by studies pro-
duced by A.I.D. and other donors that women are an important factor in
economic growth and are taking advantage of funds available for projects
for women.
3. Environmental Scrutiny of Assistance Projects
Our national concern for the environment is also reflected in our for-
eign assistance policies. In this area, two national concerns are in conflict.
On the one hand, we have an interest in preserving the environment, not
just in our own country, but throughout the world. On the other hand,
the United States is dependent upon oil, gas and strategic minerals, many
of which are only available in the developing world. This conflict is re-
flected in amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act. The section on en-
vironment formerly read as follows:
The President is authorized to furnish assistance under this subchapter
for developing and strengthening the capacity for less developed coun-
tries to protect and manage their environment and natural resources.
Special efforts shall be made to maintain and where possible restore the
land, vegetation, water, wildlife, and other resources upon which depend
economic growth and human well-being especially that of the poor.3'
The recently amended section on the environment expresses the ur-
gency of our growing concern over natural resources, since the 1973 en-
ergy crisis. The new section states:
The Congress finds that if current trends in the degradation of natural
resources in developing countries continue, they will severely undermine
the best efforts to meet basic human needs, to achieve sustained eco-
nomic growth, and to prevent international tension and conflict. The
Congress also finds that the world faces enormous, urgent, and complex
34 22 U.S.C. § 2151p(a) (1976), as added by Sec. 113 of Public Law 95-88 (91 Stat. 537)
and amended by Sec. 110 of Public Law 96-53 (93 Stat. 948), was amended and restated by
Sec. 307 of the International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981 (Public
Law 97-113; 95 Stat. 1533).
Vol. 15:213
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
problems with respect to natural resources, which require new forms of
cooperation between the United States and developing countries to pre-
vent such problems from becoming unmanageable. It is therefore, in the
economic and security interests of the United States to provide leader-
ship both in thoroughly reassessing policies relating to natural resources
and the environment, and in cooperating extensively with developing
countries in order to achieve environmentally sound development ...
In order to address the serious problem described in subsection (a), the
President is authorized to furnish assistance under [this part] for devel-
oping and strengthening the capacity of developing countries to protect
and manage their environment and natural resources. Special efforts
shall be made to maintain and where possible to restore the land, vegeta-
tion, water, wildlife, and other resources upon which depend economic
growth and human well-being, especially of the poor. 5
Although the amendment expresses Congress' growing concern over
the scarcity of natural resources, A.I.D.'s concern for protection of the
environment has not abated as a result of the amendment. The amend-
ment fortunately did not eliminate the requirement for an environmental
impact statement on all programs and projects which would significantly
affect the environment. Evaluation of environmental consequences has
been institutionalized within A.I.D. and written assessments are included
as a routine part of all project development.3 6 Happily, concern over the
scarcity of natural resources has not diminished environmental scrutiny
of assistance projects, although a greater emphasis has been placed within
the U.S. assistance program generally on developing energy resources in
third world countries.
Concern over the environment is one area in which American philos-
ophy has spread through our assistance program. A.I.D.'s emphasis on
protecting the environment, combined with a growing concern in the
world community about environmental degradation, has increased the
awareness of officials in the developing world about environmental con-
cerns. By designing projects with the environmental consequences in
mind, A.I.D. has created an awareness in developing countries about the
importance of protecting the environment, and, at the same time, has
provided model analyses which officials in developing countries can dupli-
cate in their own development programs. The United States has thus
been able to foster environmental awareness in developing countries by
demonstrating that protection of the environment is in their economic
self-interest.
An example is the impact of A.I.D.'s funding of an environmental
assessment on the Mahaweli Development Program in Sri Lanka, which
1 22 U.S.C. § 2 151p (Supp. V 1981).
36 22 U.S.C. § 2151p(c)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1981).
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involves construction of five major storage reservoirs in conjunction with
agricultural and related development in a semi-arid region comprising
more than. 420,000 hectares of land. When fully developed, the program
will increase hydroelectric output, provide new settlement opportunities
for one million people and produce more than 600,000 tons of rice and
other crops. A number of other donors such as the World Bank, United
Nations Development Programme, the EEC and other countries, are par-
ticipating in the project. The comprehensive environmental assessment
resulted in major changes to the program design and adoption of proce-
dures for watershed management; controlled logging and forest preserva-
tion; creation of fuelwood plantations, fisheries and wild preserves; and
establishment of monitoring programs for soils and pests, and rural water
supply and sanitation schemes. The Government of Sri Lanka and the
other donors agreed to the proposals. More important, the assessment re-
sulted in the involvement of a number of Sri Lanka government agencies
in the environmental aspects of the program and has led to the inclusion
of the environmental planning process as a major and permanent part of
the overall development program.17 Programs such as the one in Sri
Lanka have been successful in making one of our national priorities a
world priority.
C. Current Priorities
It is evident that the number and variety of "basic" philosophies of
foreign aid codified in the FAA have proliferated. It is difficult to tell
which priority has priority. In practice, one could conclude that the U.S.
foreign assistance program has come full circle and that political consid-
erations have again begun to predominate, as they did in the earliest pro-
grams in Greece and Turkey. Country allocations of aid generally are
made on the basis of political considerations, such as military and eco-
nomic strategy, rather than on need. Geographic emphases have changed
under different administrations; for example, the Caribbean Basin is a
present priority. At the same time, project emphases also vary. As we
have seen, the current Administration is stressing projects involving pri-
vate enterprise.
As a practical matter, once funds have been allocated to countries
and sectors through the negotiating process among A.I.D., the State De-
partment and the Office of Management and the Budget, development
projects are created with inputs from the recipient government, A.I.D.
technical staff and the U.S. Ambassador. Thus a number of different
points of view are presented. In addition, all A.I.D. projects and programs
37 Sobczak, Sri Lanka's Mahaweli Program Undergoes an Environmental Planning
Process, A.I.D. POLICY PAPER (Nov. 1, 1982).
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are subjected to an extensive review process and are analyzed to deter-
mine if they have taken into consideration the statutory priorities. Thus,
"priorities" are constantly changing and vary from one administration to
the next and from one country to another. Moreover, as discussed in the
next section, the question of allocations is further complicated by a num-
ber of statutory prohibitions which prevent the United States from fur-
nishing assistance to countries whose policies conffict with ours.
H. PROHIBITIONS ON THE USE OF FOREIGN AssISTANcE
While we have seen that foreign assistance is used as an incentive to
promote our priorities, foreign aid also may be withheld from countries
whose policies run counter to those priorities. Many of the philosophies
and values which are inherent in our affirmative program of foreign assis-
tance have their negative counterparts. The Foreign Assistance Act pro-
hibits the President from providing aid to countries which are our ene-
mies, which are hostile to our citizens, or which otherwise espouse policies
which are inimical to our interests. Clearly, we would not want to give
money to foster the economic development of our enemies. However,
which countries are our enemies is a determination which is not always
clear, or even consistent. We do not provide assistance to countries with
whom we are actively at war. Absent an actual state of war, eligibility for
our foreign assistance becomes cloudy. The President's constitutional
powers to conduct foreign policy have been limited by Congress in the
area of foreign assistance through the imposition of restrictions and con-
ditions on country eligibility for aid.38 For example, Congress has ex-
pressly prohibited furnishing assistance to the present government of
Cuba.39 In 1974, however, Congress decided to permit the President to
provide assistance to a new government in Cuba if, according to the For-
eign Assistance Act, the President deems it to be in the interest of the
United States, or if the President determines that such government has
taken appropriate steps to return property taken from United States citi-
zens or to provide equitable compensation for property taken by the pre-
sent Government of Cuba.40 At least with respect to the present govern-
ment of Cuba, we have applied the ultimate sanction in our foreign
assistance arsenal, eliminating all possibility of supplying any type of for-
eign aid to that country.
33 For an extensive analysis of the President's foreign affairs powers and encroachments
thereon by Congress, see Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign Affairs Powers Over
Foreign Aid: Part I, 1970 DuKE L.J. 292, and Wallace, The President's Exclusive Foreign
Affairs Powers Over A.I.D.: Part II, 1970 DuKE L.J. 453.
39 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(1) (1976).
40 22 U.S.C. § 2370(a)(2) (1976).
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A. Restrictions on Assistance to Unfriendly or Communist Countries
Other restrictions also limit eligibility for assistance to various na-
tions considered to be unfriendly. Angola, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam,
Syria, Libya, Iraq and South Yemen are currently on the proscribed list.41
These prohibitions can address very specific political situations. For ex-
ample, assistance to Afghanistan is conditioned on the President certify-
ing to Congress that "(1) the Government of Afghanistan has apologized
officially and assumes responsibility for the death of Ambassador Adolph
Dubbs; and (2) the Government of Afghanistan agrees to provide ade-
quate protection for all personnel of the United States Government in
Afghanistan.' 4
2
Eligibility for assistance depends on whether or not a country is
"friendly," a determination which changes with the political winds. Al-
though the Foreign Assistance Act expressly prohibits assistance to Com-
munist countries, this prohibition may be waived if the President finds
and reports to Congress that:
(1) Such assistance is vital to the security of the United States; (2) the
recipient country is not controlled by the international Communist con-
spiracy; and (3) such assistance will further promote the independence of
the recipient country from international communism."
It might seem fairly obvious that the United States would not pro-
vide economic assistance to hostile regimes, and certainly not to Commu-
nist regimes. This would seem to be consistent with the use of assistance
as a foreign policy incentive. However, the fact is that we have and do
render assistance to the "friendly people" of Communist countries, as dis-
tinguished from their governments. Moreover, Secretary of State Dulles
made a determination on December 11, 1956, which was reaffirmed by
Secretary Rusk on November 29, 1961, that "declared "Poland is not at
present 'dominated or controlled' by the U.S.S.R. and hence is eligible for
Title I and Title III P.L. 480 transactions." 44 On the basis of this determi-
nation, A.I.D. permitted assistance to the Polish Children's Hospital in
1964.45 The United States has also used foreign assistance on numerous
occasions over the years to promote better relations between the U.S. and
Communist countries and to begin to develop economic ties which might
41 See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2151 (1981) (Cambodia, Laos and Nicaragua); 22 U.S.C. § 2293
(1981) (Angola); 22 U.S.C. § 2346(a) (1981) (Syria); 22 U.S.C. § 2370 (1981) (Chile, Cuba, El
Salvador and Vietnam); 22 U.S.C. § 2372 (1981) (Argentina); 22 U.S.C. § 2374 (1981) (Af-
ghanistan); 47 Fed. Reg. 11,267 (1982) (Libya); and Exec. Order No. 12,311, 46 Fed. Reg.
34,305 (1981) (Mozambique).
4 22 U.S.C. § 2374(a)(1)-(2) (1982).
3 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f) (1976).
4 Opinion of the A.I.D. General Counsel's Office, Charles Stephenson (Jan. 20, 1964).
45 Id.
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tend to loosen the hold of the U.S.S.R. over its satellite countries.
The People's Republic of China is included on the list of Communist
countries which are ineligible for development assistance.46 However, a
determination has been made that China is a "friendly" country for pur-
poses of participation in our trade and development program.47 Our
United States Trade and Development Program provides technical assis-
tance to countries which would otherwise be ineligible for other types of
foreign assistance. The program is designed to facilitate access to natural
resources of interest to the United States and to stimulate reimbursable
aid programs. The authorizing legislation expressly provides that funds
used under this program are available notwithstanding any other provi-
sions of the Foreign Assistance Act. Thus, the Secretary of State has the
authority to declare China to be a "friendly" country for purposes of re-
ceiving aid under this program.
The United States has already made two grants to China under the
Trade and Development Program. The first is for a $400,000 feasibility
study for a hydroelectric power project. The plans call for construction of
the plant by private contractors. Since the Chinese Ministry has no expe-
rience in dealing with private enterprise, it requested assistance in negoti-
ating with the private sector. Therefore, in addition to the grant, we are
providing the expertise of the U.S. Corps of Engineers to prepare bid doc-
uments and other auxiliary support in order to help the Ministry reach
the contract stage. The second grant to China is a prefeasibility study for
three projects: a continuous aluminum casting plant, a copper mine and
beneficiation facility, and a titanium sponge plant. In addition to these
grants, over the last three years, A.I.D. (TDP) has financed approxi-
mately $500,000 of exchange programs for technicians under the hydro-
power protocol. Interest in assisting China in its developmental efforts are
increasing. Amendments to the Foreign Assistance Act intended to bene-
fit China have been introduced in both Houses of Congress which would
permit the President to authorize assistance to Communist countries
which would otherwise be prohibited, if he determines that such assis-
tance is important to the security of the United States. 48 The Senate
Committee, "in making this change, recognizes that the People's Republic
of China, although it has a communist form of government, is a non-allied
nation which plays a helpful strategic role.' 49 Congress has thus implicitly
recognized that providing development assistance to China will open ad-
ditional doors between our two countries, and will help the Chinese main-
46 22 U.S.C. § 2370(f) (1976).
47 22 U.S.C. § 2421 (Supp. V 1981).
48 REPORT OF THE CommrrrEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS ON S. 2608, S. REP. No. 464, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1982), and H.R. REP. No. 547, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
491d.
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tain their economic and political stability. The change in our develop-
ment assistance policy with respect to China reflects new political
realities. Thus, even Communist countries may be considered "friendly"
for some purposes and be entitled to assistance under some
circumstances.
B. Extraterritorial Protection of U.S. Citizens and Property
Foreign assistance is withheld from countries with which we do not
have diplomatic relations and which do not protect our citizens and their
property. In order to provide assistance, the recipient country must es-
tablish diplomatic relations with the United States and must negotiate
and enter into a bilateral assistance agreement with us.5 0 The United
States also uses foreign assistance leverage to protect its citizens and
their property. The Foreign Assistance Act provides that the President
must consider terminating assistance to a country which fails to take ade-
quate measures to prevent damage or destruction of United States prop-
erty by mob action and to provide adequate compensation for such dam-
age or destruction.51 In most cases, recipient countries have provided
protection for U.S. embassies and other U.S,. property and have compen-
sated the U.S. government and U.S. citizens for damage caused by mobs
or revolutionary groups.52 This legislatively-approved threat of with-
drawal of foreign assistance provides at least an illusion of protection for
our citizens abroad and can be used to bargain for additional police pro-
tection in times of political crisis or social unrest.
Protecting the property of our citizens and corporations from expro-
priation without compensation has equally, high priority in our foreign
policy scheme. Although every nation has the sovereign right, in the ab-
sence of specific governmental undertakings" to the contrary, to expropri-
ate foreign property under international law, the United States insists
that its citizens are entitled to receive prompt, adequate and effective
compensation for their property. This legal right to compensation is the
50 22 U.S.C. § 2370(t) (1976).
51 22 U.S.C. § 2370(j) (1976).
5s Opinion of the A.I.D. General Counsel's Office,; Stephen B. Ives (Feb. 4, 1970) (In
1969, a small group of University students wrecked and burned the U.S. Ambassador's auto-
mobile and the Turkish government made restitution); Opinion of the A.I.D. General Coun-
sel's Office, Arthur B. Gardiner, Jr. (Apr. 10, 1973) (Youths affiliated with the pro-Soviet
party of Bangladesh vandalized four USIS buildings in 1972 and 1973 and the Government
of Bangladesh assigned police to protect the buildings, expressed "sincere regrets" over the
incidents, and made restitution); Opinion of the A.I.D. General Counsel's Office, Charles S.
Gladson (July 6, 1976) (Anti-American violence occurred in Cyprus in April 1976 following
announcement of the signing of a Defense Cooperation Treaty between Turkey and the
United States. Attempts by mobs to stone and enter the U.S. embassy were thwarted by
Cyprus security officials and compensation for damage was provided).
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basis for Section 620(e) of the Foreign Assistance Act, commonly known
as the "Hickenlooper Amendment," which mandates suspension of assis-
tance if a country expropriates property owned by American citizens
without taking steps to provide appropriate compensation." In 1973, rec-
ognizing that the Hickenlooper Amendment was counterproductive be-
cause it denied the President flexibility in providing foreign assistance,
Congress amended Hickenlooper to allow the President to waive its provi-
sions, if he determines that "such a waiver is important to the national
interest of the United States."' ' Congress noted that the automatic sanc-,
tion of suspending all assistance might leave the President without any
discretion, even in cases where an American company might have pro-
voked the expropriation by its own actions.5 5 Many court decisions have
analyzed the application of Hickenlooper in cases of expropriation and
have discussed its effect on our foreign relations.5 s Despite large numbers
of expropriation claims, this section has been invoked to cut off assistance
only twice: once, in 1973, in Pakistan and once, in 1979, after Ethiopia
nationalized the property of 21 U.S. firms and citizens. In the case of
3 22 U.S.C. 2370(e)(1) (1976).
"Id. This amendment was accomplished by Pub. L. No. 93-189, 87 Stat. 714 (1973).
5 H.R. REP. No. 388, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 45 (1973).
" The Hickenlooper Amendment, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1976), originated in the reaction
of Congress to the expropriation of a subsidiary of ITT by Brazil in 1962; the expropriation
occurred just prior to a visit to this country by Brazil's President in his search for financial
assistance for Brazil. Congress enacted the Amendment in order to deny foreign assistance
from the United States to any country that had expropriated assets of an American com-
pany without adequate compensation.
The original Hickenlooper Amendment was expanded by the Sabbatino Amendment, 22
U.S.C. § 2370(e) (1976), as Congress reacted to the Supreme Court's decision in Banco Na-
cional De Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In that case, the Supreme Court held,
that the act of state doctrine applied in expropriation cases because the Executive was bet-
ter equipped to determine expropriation damages in its role as a political body. Overriding
the Sabbatino decision, Congress provided in the Sabbatino Amendment that
"[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law, no court of the United States shall decline on
the ground of the federal act of state doctrine to make a determination on the merits giving
effect to the principles of international law. . . " where expropriation of U.S. assets has
taken place unless the President specifically requests the court so to use the act of state
doctrine. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1976). Examples of other important litigation involving
the Hickenlooper Amendment are: Banco Nacional De Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1965), afl'd, 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967) (further definition of the act of state
doctrine); Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.2d
864 (1966) (includes discussion regarding sovereign immunity); and Republic of Iraq v. First
National City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965) (importance of location of expropriated
property and extent of foreign government's reach as to expropriated assets). See generally
Lillich, The Protection of Foreign Investment and the Hickenlooper Amendment, 112 U.
PA. L. REv. 1116 (1964); Recent Case, International Law-Sovereign Immunity and Act of
State-Hickenlooper Amendment Precludes Assertion of Act of State Where Act is Viola-
tive of International Law, 21 VAND. L. REv. 388 (1968).
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Ethiopia, most of the expropriations took place in 1975 and 1976 and
Ethiopia declared that compensation would be provided. However, no
meaningful progress toward resolution of the claims had occurred by
1979, so bilateral assistance was suspended.57 As of 1980, 136 disputes
involving private investment in 51 countries were officially listed by the
Department of State, not including claims arising from the then pending
crises in Iran and Nicaragua.8 In several instances, cases have been pend-
ing for more than a decade for claims in countries to which the United
States continues to provide bilateral assistance.59 A complete discussion
of the application of this provision is beyond the scope of this article.
However, it is clear from the number of expropriation claims presently
pending that Section 620(e) is rarely invoked to terminate assistance and
that foreign policy considerations override private losses.
In addition to addressing expropriation concerns, the Foreign Assis-
tance Act also provides some leverage for insuring that governments pay
debts owed to American citizens and companies. The Act directs that no
assistance shall be provided to the government of any country which is
indebted to any United States citizen for goods or services furnished or
ordered, where: (1) the citizen has exhausted available legal remedies in-
cluding arbitration; or (2) the debt is not denied or contested by such
government; or, (3) the indebtedness arises as an unconditional guarantee
of payment given by such government or predecessor government.6 0 Con-
gress again recognized with respect to this prohibition that the President
may require flexibility and thus included an exception if the President
finds that withdrawing assistance would be contrary to the national secur-
ity. The debt provision has never been used to terminate assistance be-
cause A.I.D. has always found one of the exceptions to be applicable, usu-
ally that the debt is contested or denied by the government."e
The precipitous increase in international terrorist activity prompted
Congress to enact a prohibition against furnishing assistance to countries
which grant sanctuary to international terrrists.6 2 In the legislative de-
l
57 DEPARTMENT OF STATE BuREAu OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH, DIsPUTEs INVOLVING
U.S. PRIVATE DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT MARCH 1, 1977-FEBRuARY 29, 1980, Unclassified
Report No. 1441, at 27-28 (Aug. 18, 1980).
" Id. at i and 3.
19 Id. at 11-12. Morrocco, 110 land expropriations pending since 1973; Burma, 4 expro-
priations pending since 1963, 1964, and 1965; and Somalia, Caltex expropriation since 1970.
e0 22 U.S.C. § 2370(c) (1976).
61 E.g., Opinion of the A.I.D. General Counsel's Office, Herbert Morris (Mar. 29, 1962)
(debts contested and denied by Japan); Opinion of A.I.D. General Counsel's Office, F. King-
ston Berlew (Mar. 23, 1982) (debt contested by Turkey).
62 22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1976), which was added by Sec. 303 of the International Security
Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 (Pub. L. No. 94-329, 90 Stat. 753); see also
Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-121, §
520, 95 Stat. 1647 (1982).
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bates concerning this amendment, Senator Stone used the seizure of the
OPEC oil ministers in Vienna as an example of acts constituting terrorist
activity. 3 This provision, however, can be waived if the President "finds
national security to require otherwise." " The President is also directed to
consider excluding from assistance countries which seize, or impose pen-
alties or sanctions against, any United States fishing vessel as a result of
fishing activities in international waters.6 5 This section is not an absolute
prohibition and leaves discretion as to its application in the hands of the
President. 8 If a country harasses our vessels, the section is available as
an effective lever to terminate such actions, at least with respect to coun-
tries to which we provide substantial assistance.
C. Nuclear Proliferation and Termination of Aid
A strong concern which is reflected in U.S. foreign assistance policy is
the issue of nuclear proliferation. Section 669 of the Foreign Assistance
Act forbids furnishing economic or military assistance to countries which
either deliver or receive nuclear enrichment equipment, materials or tech-
nology, unless, before such delivery, certain international safeguards have
been observed.67 The Act does provide for a waiver of the prohibition if
the President determines and certifies that 1) termination of such assis-
tance would have a serious adverse effect on vital United States interests,
and 2) he has received reliable assurances that the country in question
will not acquire or develop nuclear weapons or assist other nations in do-
ing so. At the time this provision was passed, the United States had re-
ceived information that Brazil was purchasing a German nuclear power
plant, Korea was purchasing a French plant, and Pakistan had a contract
with France to build a nuclear fuel reprocessing plant.68
Our concerns about Pakistan's proliferation threat provided the only
test to date of the use of foreign assistance as a nonproliferation tool.
Pakistan claimed it was only responding to the development of a nuclear
bomb by India, its historic enemy. The United States considered the
63 122 CONG. REC. S1754 (1976).
22 U.S.C. § 2371 (1976).
65 22 U.S.C. § 2370(o) (1976).
" This discretion was exercised by the President in favor of continuing assistance to
Peru and Equador during the 1970's despite seizures of U.S. fishing vessels. Opinion of the
A.ID. General Counsel's Office, Arthur Gardiner, Jr. (Apr. 10, 1973).
67 22 U.S.C. § 2429 (1976).
68 122 CONG. REC. S15139 (1976); 122 CONG. REC. S8668 (1976); Pakistan Atom Deal
Affirmed by France, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1977, at 1, col. 1; France Reaffirms Nuclear Sale,
Washington Post, Sept. 9, 1977. As Congressional Record S8668 and the N.Y. Times cita-
tions above both indicate, South Korea ultimately did not consumate its purchase of a
French nuclear processing plant.
69 Pakistan Atom Deal Affirmed by France, supra note 68.
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reprocessing plant dangerous because it separates out small quantities of
the highly explosive plutonium metal which can be used for nuclear
weapons from the spent fuels used in conventional nuclear power reactors
to generate electricity. 0 The Carter and Ford Administrations tried un-
successfully to discourage Pakistan's plans.7 1 The United States was simi-
larly unsuccessful in obtaining Pakistan's assurance of compliance with
nuclear safeguards or with obtaining their agreement to allow inspection
of their unsafeguarded nuclear facilities by the International Atomic En-
ergy Agency.72
Furthermore, the U.S. government had reason to believe that Paki-
stan was in the process of developing an uranium enrichment capability.
For this reason, Section 669 was triggered and assistance to Pakistan was
terminated in 1979.73
Termination of aid is itself a delicate process. Recognizing that im-
mediate termination of ongoing assistance projects would cause unneces-
sary losses to both the recipient country and the United States, Congress
provided that funds will remain available for up to eight months from the
date of termination to cover the necessary expenses of winding up
programs.74
Termination of assistance is a drastic measure, not just because of
the detrimental effect upon the recipient country, but because of the po-
tential enormous losses to the United States. Due to the nature of the
appropriations process for the Agency for International Development, ap-
propriations are usually made on an annual basis. Therefore, in order to
maximize the use of funds available, A.I.D. obligates funds for projects on
an incremental basis rather than obligating for the total project all at
once.
For example, if A.I.D. is building a canal with cement linings, the
project may take from six to ten years to complete. Funds for the project
are obligated in phases, with the first phase covering the digging of the
canal which might take two or three years. If assistance is terminated
during the digging stage, how much of the remaining canal can be com-
pleted depends on the language of the statute which provided for termi-
nation. The Hickenlooper Amendment, Section 620(e) of the Foreign As-
sistance Act 7 5 uses the language that the "President shall suspend
assistance" to governments which expropriate property without compen-
70 Id. See also France Reaffirms Nuclear Sale, Washington Post, Sept. 9, 1977.
71 125 CONG. Rac. S5287 (daily ed. May 3, 1979). The United States sent Warren Chris-
topher to Pakistan on March 1 and 2, 1979, and his discussions were said to have included
the topic of U.S. opposition to Pakistan's purchase of the French plant.
72 Id.
73 Id.
74 22 U.S.C. § 2367 (1976) (as amended Supp. V 1981).
7$ 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1) (1976).
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sation. The A.I.D. Office of General Counsel has interpreted the word
"suspend" strictly so that even projects for which funds are already obli-
gated are stopped. Where Congress uses the words "shall not provide" in
a provision for termination for assistance, the A.I.D. Office of General
Counsel has interpreted that language to mean that no new funds may be
obligated for a project, but disbursements can be continued on existing
obligations. Thus, in the case of expropriation, in the canal project exam-
ple, the project would be terminated before completion of the digging
even though funds for digging were fully obligated. On the other hand, if
the canal project was terminated in a country which began to develop a
nuclear bomb in violation of Section 669, A.I.D. would have the authority
to complete the digging. Then, in addition, A.I.D. could use Section 617
to obligate new funds to complete the cement lining of the canal, assum-
ing it could be shown that the canal would be worthless without the lin-
ing, in order to prevent a total loss to the United States. Thus, Congress
has provided the United States with some ability to protect itself against
leaving white elephants in countries where assistance has been termi-
nated. Of course, in extreme cases, the United States can, as we did when
the Russians entered Afghanistan, terminate all projects immediately.
In the case of Pakistan, the United States elected to complete some
existing projects and to discontinue others. However, shortly after the
United States terminated assistance, the Russians invaded Afghanistan.
This led to a dramatic reassessment of U.S. political interests in the area.
Pakistan's security and stability assumed greater importance. In order to
support Pakistan, it was important for the United States to reestablish its
aid program. 76 However, the United States was legally prevented from do-
ing so because Pakistan would still not comply with the provisions of Sec-
tion 669. The President was forced to go to Congress with this predica-
ment in order to negotiate a resolution which would enforce nuclear
safeguards but allow the United States to develop a relationship with Pa-
kistan which was deemed politically important. Congress recognized the
importance of Pakistan to our foreign policy but refused to repeal Section
669. Instead Congress passed the special provision, Section 620E,77 which
expressly made an exception for Pakistan alone on the basis of the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan. In fact, Congress recited the political facts in
the section itself:
The Congress recognizes that Soviet Forces occupying Afghanistan poses
a security threat to Pakistan. The Congress also recognizes that an inde-
pendent and democratic Pakistan with continued friendly ties to the
United States is in the interest of both nations. The Congress finds that
7' Rubin, U.S. Aid for Pakistan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 19, 1982, at A31, col. 1.
77 22 U.S.C. § 2375 (Supp. V 1981).
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the United States assistance will help Pakistan maintain its indepen-
dence. Assistance to Pakistan is intended to benefit the people of Paki-
stan by helping them to meet the burdens imposed by the presence of
Soviet Forces in Afghanistan and by promoting economic development.
In authorizing assistance to Pakistan, it is the intent of Congress to pro-
mote the expeditious restoration of full civil liberties and representative
government in Pakistan. The Congress further recognizes that it is in the
mutual interest of Pakistan and the United States to avoid the pro-
foundly destabilizing effects of the proliferation of nuclear explosive de-
vices or the capacity to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear
devices.78
Congress finally agreed to authorize the President to waive the
prohibitions of Section 669 between the date of enactment of the amend-
ment and September 30, 1987, to provide assistance to Pakistan.7 ' The
President exercised this authority on February 11, 1982, and reestab-
lished our assistance program in Pakistan. A.I.D. has reopened the Mis-
sion in Pakistan and is now developing a comprehensive new program of
assistance in that country.80 Whether, in the future, Congress will main-
tain its strong posture against nuclear proliferation or will follow the Pa-
kistan precedent and establish another exception for other countries
under Section 669 will depend upon the strength of the political necessi-
ties at the time. In any event, the prohibition remains available as a nego-
tiating tool which can be used to encourage countries receiving assistance
to join the International Atomic Energy Agency and comply with nuclear
safeguards.
D. Social and Financial Obstructions to Extension of Aid
The Foreign Assistance Act also gives the President authority to cut
off assistance to countries which take acts considered to be against U.S.
national interests. For example, although the United States does not force
its equal rights philosophy on other countries, it also does not allow coun-
tries to whom it is furnishing assistance to discriminate against U.S. of-
ficers or employees on the basis of race, religion, national origin or sex."
The United States therefore, has Jewish and female A.I.D. officials work-
ing in Arab and Moslem countries and is able to spread the principle of
78 Id.
79 Id. For further information about the events which led to passage of this amend-
ment, see S. REP. No. 83, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 91-94 (1981), and H.R. REP. No. 413, 97th
Cong. 1st Sess. 87-89 (1981).
80 The drama concerning Pakistan's nuclear facility is still unfolding;, the recent Wash-
ington Post's report that India had plans for a preemptive strike against Pakistan's facility
was denied by India as "absolute rubbish," India Denies Plan to Hit Pakistani Nuclear
Plants, Washington Post, Dec. 21, 1982, at A10, col 4.
81 22 U.S.C. § 2426(b) (1976).
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equality by example.
The Foreign Assistance Act also addresses our country's growing nar-
cotics problem. A few developing countries are the main producers of the
opium poppy from which heroin is derived.82 In order to try to halt the
importation of heroin into the United States, Congress decided to try to
stop production at its source. Thus Congress ordered the President to
suspend economic and military assistance, including Title I of Public Law
480 food aid, to any country which fails to take adequate steps to prevent
drugs from being sold illegally within the country to U.S. Government
personnel or their dependents or from entering the United States unlaw-
fully 83 The same section also authorizes the President to furnish assis-
tance to any country or international organization for controlling the pro-
duction and smuggling of narcotic and psychotropic drugs.
Other sections of the Act provide the United States with leverage to
encourage developing countries to become fiscally responsible, and to
honor debts to the United States and to international organizations which
it supports. No assistance can be furnished to a country which is in de-
fault for more than six months on loans to the United States, unless the
President determines that continued assistance to such country is in the
national interest.' Although a substantial amount of American foreign
assistance is provided in the form of outright grants, a major portion of
our assistance is made in the form of loans, usually at concessional
rates.85 Aid to Zaire was almost terminated in 1981, when Zaire defaulted
on loans to the United States and was slow in negotiating and completing
a debt rescheduling agreement. The rescheduling agreement was signed
just in time to avoid an interruption in A.I.D. project implementation.
The default provision has been interpreted flexibly to permit continua-
tion of aid if a country enters into a negotiated international agreement
fixing a new schedule for payment of outstanding debts.
The United States, as the largest single contributor to the United
Nations, has an interest in insuring that other countries meet their pay-
ment obligations as members of the United Nations. The United States
presently pays one quarter of the total United Nations' assessed budget,
"' Burma, Thailand, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Turkey, and Iran have all been substantial
recipients of American aid and are the major producers of opium.
8, 22 U.S.C. § 2291(a) (1976). For a discussion of State Department opposition to this
amendment and a comprehensive analysis of United States bilateral and multilateral aid to
combat drug traffic, see Freedman, U.S. Bilateral and Multilateral Aid to Nations Which
Do Not Cooperate with the United States to Combat International Drug Traffic, 7 INr'L L.
& POL. 361 (1974).
22 U.S.C. § 2370(q) (1976).
85 By statute, A.LD. is required to use 30% of its 1982 appropriated funds for loans.
Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriation Act, Pub. L. No. 97-121, 95 Stat.
1647 (1981) (Title H - unnumbered section).
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as well as contributing funds to many of the voluntary organizations
under the U.N. aegis. Therefore, Congress has directed the President to
'take into consideration a country's status with respect to its dues, assess-
ments and other obligations to the United Nations in deciding whether to
provide assistance.8 6 If a country is in arrears, the President is required to
report to Congress setting forth the assurance given by the govermnent of
paying all of its arrearages or a full explanation of the "unusual or excep-
tional circumstances which render it economically incapable of giving
such assurances." 87 The provision thus provides a useful means of encour-
aging countries to honor their fiscal commitments to the United Nations.
The United States has traditionally had a strong commitment to
human rights. This commitment is embodied in the Foreign Assistance
Act in a section which precludes assistance to:
[T]he government of any country which engages in a consistent pattern
of gross violations of internationally recognized human rights, including
torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, pro-
longed detention without charges, causing the disappearance of persons
by the abduction and clandestine detention of those persons, or other
flagrant denial of the right to life, liberty, and the security of person,
unless such assistance will directly benefit the needy people in such
country.8 8
This provision reflects one of the fundamental philosophies of our foreign
assistance program: to encourage and protect freedom and democracy."
Adoption of this human rights policy also expresses Congressional senti-
ment that the U.S. bilateral assistance program should focus on the elimi-
nation of poverty and not support a particular regime.90 The application
of this provision has been the subject of several law review articles 1 and
it is one of the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act which has, at
least in the past, achieved major international influence. Under President
Carter, concern for human rights violations was a policy priority.92 The
Carter Administration reformed foreign assistance policies to prevent
awards of "liberal grants and loans to repressive regimes which violate
86 22 U.S.C. § 2370(u) (1976).
87 Id.
22 U.S.C. § 2151n(a) (1976).
89 S. REP. No. 620, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1973).
90 Id.
81 See, e.g., Balmer, Use of Conditions in Foreign Legislation, 7 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL.
197-238 (1977), and Derian, Human Rights in American Foreign Policy, 55 NOTRE DAME
LAW. 264-80 (1979).
9 Human Rights, 33 CONG. Q. ALMANAC 321-322 (1977); Carter, Speech on Humane
Purposes in Foreign Policy (1977). For an excellent analysis of application of President
Carter's policy on human rights, see also Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on
Human Rights Practices, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246 (1982).
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human rights."9 The reformed policies resulted in aid cutbacks for Ethi-
opia, Uruguay, the Central African Empire and Argentina." These poli-
cies, as well as similar human rights policies which applied to loans by
international development banks were reversed by the present
Administration. 5
There has been considerable criticism of the present Administration's
decision to diminish scrutiny of human rights violations in countries re-
ceiving assistance. 9 The present Administration's reluctance to use this
provision to influence human rights policies is the subject of continued
debate in Congress where pressure has grown to mandate enforcement of
this provision by the United States, especially in El Salvador, Haiti and
the Philippines. Although the present Administration has taken the posi-
tion that it will continue to discourage human rights violations abroad in
less "public" ways, the United States appears, at least in the eyes of the
international community, to have relinquished one of its most effective
foreign policy levers for protecting dissidents abroad.
E. Leverage Achieved from Prohibitions
The leverage we achieve from various prohibitions and policies em-
bodied in the Foreign Assistance Act in terms of foreign policy influence
increases in direct proportion to the dollar amount of aid which we pro-
vide to a country and the percent of aid which is provided by the United
States, as opposed to other individual and multilateral donors. In Egypt,
for example, A.I.D. is required by statute to provide $750,000,000 of assis-
tance which dwarfs all other assistance received by that country.9 If we
were to terminate our assistance to Egypt, the results to the Egyptian
,1 President Carter's March 17, 1977 Message to Congress on Foreign Aid, CONG. Q. 62-
A (Apr. 1978).
" Human Rights, supra note 92, at 322. Section 116(d)(2) Report to Congress, Febru-
ary 1978, at 2.
,5 U.S., in Change, Is Backing Loans to 4 Latin Lands, N.Y. Times, July 9, 1981, at 1,
col. 5; Certifying Chile on Rights is Wrong, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1982, at 27, col 1. It
should be noted that under President Carter, "[i]n 1978 consideration of human rights was
made an integral part of A.I.D.'s budget justifications and in allocation of resources." Sec-
tion 116(d)(2), Report to Congress, January 1980, at 1. This statement was made in each
report under President Carter. The first report issued after the current administration re-
formed human rights policies deletes this statement. Section 116(d)(2), Report to Congress,
January 1982.
" See, e.g., South Korea urges U.S. to alter Rights Policy, Washington Post, Dec. 25,
1982, at 1, col. 1, where South Korea opposition leader Kim Dae Jung urged the United
States to speak out openly for human rights rather than pursue "quiet diplomacy"; Certify-
ing Chile on Rights is wrong, N.Y. Times, Mar. 23, 1982, at 27, col. 1; Certifying El Salva-
dor, N.Y. Times, July 27, 1982, at 33, col. 1; 3 Human Rights Groups Assail Reagan Policy,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 12, 1982, at 6, col. 1.
22 U.S.C. § 2346 (a)(1) (Supp. V 1981).
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economy would be serious. On the other hand, we provide much smaller
amounts to many countries in Africa who are already receiving assistance
from a variety of European, Canadian and Scandinavian donors, as well
as international organizations. Our ability to influence the policies of
countries which receive smaller amounts is less than in countries who are
more dependent upon our financial assistance.
Our Ambassadors have always been aware that they have a great deal
more influence within a country if the United States is providing eco-
nomic assistance. If we are not providing development assistance, our
Ambassadors find it far more difficult to discuss economic policy with
country officials. Providing assistance entitles us to a seat at the economic
policy table and provides us with an opportunity to nudge countries into
what we regard as fiscally sound policies.
IV. THE USE OF POLICY DIALOGUE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF U.S.
FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
Another important use of the foreign aid program is as a means of
inducing internal policy changes within recipient countries which provide
a more favorable climate for economic development. These policy changes
are based on existing economic and social conditions within the develop-
ing country and must be particularly tailored to the conditions and cul-
ture. Unlike the policies which are expressly set forth in the Foreign As-
sistance Act and which are discussed in Parts II and III of this article, the
power to induce these policy reforms is totally within the discretion of the
implementing agency A.I.D., and the nature of such reforms is not speci-
fied in U.S. foreign aid legislation.
A. The Concept of Policy Dialogue
The development assistance community has long realized that do-
mestic economic policies in third world countries may thwart develop-
ment efforts. Even well designed and well executed economic assistance
projects may fail to have a significant development impact in the absence
of a favorable economic policy environment. "[T]he soundness of domes-
tic, economic and social policies is in general the dominant long-term in-
fluence on development ... economic assistance in support of ill-con-
ceived policies would be a poor investment indeed.""8
Although this common sense policy has frequently been ignored in
the practice of aid in development, the importance of the principle has
been recognized throughout the U.S. foreign assistance program. Presi-
08 AGENCY FOR INT'L DEVELOPMENT, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE CHAIRMAN OF THE DE-
VELOPMENT COORDINATION COMMITEE=, DEVELOPMENT ISSUES 1982, at 43.
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dent John F. Kennedy declared in a 1961 message to Congress on the
subject of foreign aid:
If our foreign aid funds are to be prudently and effectively used, we need
a whole new set of basic concepts and principles: ... Special attention to
those nations most willing and able to mobilize their own resources,
make necessary social and economic reforms, engage in long-range plan-
ning, and make the other efforts necessary if these are to reach the stage
of self-sustaining growth .... " (Emphasis added)
A.I.D. has attempted to influence policy reforms in developing coun-
tries throughout its existence with varying degrees of success. However,
the present A.I.D. Administrator, Peter McPherson, has elevated the level
of concern for encouraging necessary policy changes to one of his four top
priorities. 00 In the words of the Administrator:
We believe that the policies and programs of the third world are more
important than the assistance we give them. This point is critical. No
doubt, our assistance is very important to bring reasonable economic
growth, but the third world will grow and prosper first and foremost be-
cause of its own policies and programs. 10 1
Discussion of what constitutes appropriate policy influence necessi-
tates a definition of terms. Perhaps the best explanation is found in a
recently published A.I.D. policy paper which makes the following
distinction:
The policy influence continuum encompasses, among other things, the
concepts of leverage and of dialogue. Given that the parties' viewpoints
differ, "LEVERAGE" REFERS TO THE CAPACITY TO HAVE ONE
VIEWPOINT PREVAIL OVER THE OTHER. "DIALOGUE" IS BET-
TER UNDERSTOOD AS A MECHANISM WHEREBY EITHER
VIEWPOINT OR BOTH CAN CHANGE TO BRIDGE THE INITIAL
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO. Through a 'dialogue,' then, the
aid recipient comes to view the policy advice as genuinely in the interest
of its own economic progress. Through the application of 'leverage,' in-
stead, the aid recipient agrees to enact a certain policy because of threats
of damage or promises of gain, and not because it concurs with the other
party's views of the policy's desirable effects. In actual practice, the di-
viding line between leverage and dialogue is blurred. Even a naked threat
or an explicit bribe does not usually entirely rule out the possibility of a
dialogue - that is, of a change in either party's viewpoint. And the least
coercive, friendliest sort of policy dialogue almost always entails the pos-
"See supra note 1, at 6.
100 The Next Generation of World Development, an address by M. Peter McPherson to
the Washington Leadership Conference of the United Nations Association, May 16, 1981.
101 Development Strategies for the 1980's, an address by Peter McPherson to the Na-
tional Conference of former Peace Corps Volunteers, June 19, 1982.
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sibility that some form of leverage will be exercised at some point.
Focusing attention on the availability of potential leverage as a means of
influence can be badly misleading. Potential leverage is only a possible
facilitator of the policy dialogue, and is neither a sufficient nor a neces-
sary condition for its success. On the contrary, if exercised clumsily, it
may in the longer term be counterproductive Thus, to find that U.S.
bilateral aid carries strong potential leverage in a particular country does
not in the least require that it be actually used as such. On the contrary,
a priori common sense as well as the AID experience of the 1960s suggest
that influence on policy is maximized by providing the recipient coun-
try's government with full 'information' on the availability of leverage
and the consequences of its use, but actually abstaining from using it.102
(Emphasis added)
The concept of policy dialogue is applicable to all of the U.S. bilat-
eral economic assistance programs, regardless of the specific aid instru-
ment in question. In some instances, the aggregate A.I.D. program in a
particular country can be used as the vehicle to discuss policy changes; in
other cases, such a dialogue may be based on particular constraints and
opportunities in individual economic support fund, development assis-
tance and Public Law 480 projects. Since foreign policy motivations are
dominant in the provision of economic support funds, it is more difficult
to use these funds as an instrument of leverage. Unfortunately, recipient
countries are often all too aware of the strength of commitment of Ameri-
can support and may use our own foreign policy objectives as an excuse
for avoiding painful policy adjustments.103 However, in some cases, nota-
bly Afghanistan and South Korea, where the motivation shifted from se-
curity or short-term political objectives to longer-term development goals,
the emphasis on self-help increased and the programs were concomitantly
more successful.
B. Policy Dialogue and Development Assistance
Development assistance, because it is primarily project oriented, has
traditionally been a more successful vehicle for establishing a policy dia-
logue than economic support funds. Although in some countries, the
small amount of development aid the U.S. provides somewhat limits its
ability to influence policy changes, some 32 developing countries receive
over $20 million each in total U.S. bilateral economic assistance and
therefore are prime candidates for an effective policy dialogue. °' The fact
that development assistance is project oriented provides an opening for
an exchange of views on how the economic policy environment will affect
102 Approaches to the Policy Dialogue, A.I.D. Policy Paper 5-6 (August 1982).
103 Id. at 21.
104 Id. at 22.
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the success of the project. Such a discussion may lead to a consideration
of broader policy issues, such as domestic agricultural pricing policies.
Public Law 480 food aid also provides substantial potential for policy re-
form and greater emphasis is being placed on the use of this type of assis-
tance to promote more effective agricultural and rural development poli-
cies in recipient countries.
Since Public Law 480 food imports have an impact on food availabil-
ity and rural development in the recipient country, as well as balance of
payments implications, Public Law 480 programs are an effective instru-
ment for introducing discussions of either macroeconomic or micropolicy
changes. For example, a current Public Law 480 agreement between the
United States and Pakistan contains a provision for stimulating Pakistani
production of vegetable oils, which is designed to help Pakistan reduce its
dependence on vegetable oil imports.10 5 A.I.D. is attempting to encourage
greater use of policy dialogue when negotiating new Public Law 480
agreements in order to increase the developmental effects of our food as-
sistance programs.
The question which naturally arises is whether influencing policy re-
form is a legitimate aim of the U.S. foreign assistance program. Some
critics contend that the United States should not be overtly obtrusive
into the affairs of other countries and that matters of policy reform, espe-
cially macroeconomic policies, should be left to the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMF) or the International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment (IBRD).1°0 However, a more logical view, and certainly the
prevailing one in the development assistance community, is that it is not
only wise but essential for donors to encourage policy reforms because
they have a responsibility to maximize the success of their development
assistance and such success depends to a large extent on the existence of
a favorable policy environment in the recipient country. Most donors be-
lieve IMF and IBRD efforts to influence macroeconomic policies of devel-
oping countries are insufficient and that the donor community must sup-
port and promote such changes through the use of their own bilateral
programs in order to maximize the effect of multilateral efforts. This view
was expressed by former A.I.D. Deputy Administrator, Joseph C. Wheeler
in his recent testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee on
105 Id. at 25.
206 For a discussion of the IMF's use of conditionality, see Gold, Conditionality, IMF
pamphlet series No. 31, Washington, D.C.; Guitian, Fund Conditionality and the Interna-
tional Adjustment Process: The Early Period 1950-1970, FINANCE AND D vELopENT,
March 1981, at 8; Fund Conditionality and the International Adjustment Process: A Look
into the 1980s, FNANCE Am DvRELorprr, June 1981, at 18. For a description of use of the
policy dialogue in structural adjustment lending programs, see Landell - Mills, Structural
Adjustment Lending: Early Experience, FNANCE AND DEVELOPMNT, December 1981, at 17;
Stern, Structural Adjustment Lending, WORLD BANK, May 9, 1980, at R80-122.
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our foreign assistance program. Based on his two decades of experience in
development as an A.I.D. career Foreign Service Officer, Mr. Wheeler
made the following assessment:
First, I think we must be more effective in our policy dialogue with less
developed countries. We need to sponsor a policy framework which will
encourage development benefitting the total populations of the countries
we help. This means universal primary education, health outreach pro-
grams reaching the whole population and policies which encourage agri-
cultural production. In this connection I believe we have tended to leave
too much to the IMF and the World Bank and have not given them the
support they need in order to persuade countries to adopt sensible ex-
change rate policies, agricultural price policies, and other policies which
will encourage the full use of agricultural production assets. Similarly, I
think we need to encourage, government to get out of wasteful govern-
ment industries which are uneconomic and to leave more of the produc-
tion process to a competitive private sector. We need to be more willing
to help government establish the rules and regulations needed in order to
assure a competitive process.10 7 (Emphasis added)
Development efforts often fail in third world countries due to
counterproductive domestic economic policies. In Africa, agricultural
pricing policies and the proliferation of parastatals (state organizations
which control agricultural production and distribution) are two primary
constraints on agricultural development. 0 8 For example, in Mali, the gov-
ernment has established prices for rice which are so low as to discourage
production and to create a black market. A study has shown that it cost
farmers 83 Malian francs to produce a kilo of rice, but the government
paid farmers only 60 Malian francs per kilo.109 Our experience in Paki-
stan, where A.I.D. worked with the government to develop a wheat pro-
gram, demonstrates what can be achieved if projects are tied to policy
changes. As part of the U.S. effort to improve wheat production in Paki-
stan, A.I.D. financed imported fertilizer during Pakistan's construction of
its own fertilizer production capacity. As part of the plan for develop-
ment, the Pakistanis raised the price of wheat paid to the farmer closer to
world market values and opened the fertilizer market to the private sec-
tor. These strategies increased the wheat crop from a previous record of
7.5 million tons to approximately 12 million tons today.110
If policy discussions are not handled with sufficient sensitivity, how-
ever, the results can be disastrous. A well publicized example occurred in
107 Statement of Joseph C. Wheeler before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Au-
gust 17, 1982.
108 See Eicher, Facing up to Africa's Food Crisis, FOREIGN AFFAmS 151, 160 (Fall 1982).
10 Id. at 160.
110 Supra note 107, at 15-16.
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Colombia in 1966 when donors combined to put pressure on the govern-
ment to get it to agree to IMF demands for a currency devaluation. The
pressure was so heavy and crude that Colombia's President, Carlos Llears
Restrepo made a dramatic appearance on television in November 1966 to
denounce the pressure, reject the conditions, and enact strict new ex-
change rate and price controls. The matter ended happily, after more dis-
creet and diplomatic negotiations resumed to improve Colombia's balance
of payments. During the negotiations, the IMF backed down and, less
than three months after the Llears speech, agreed to new standby ar-
rangements without including an earlier demand for a specific timetable
for exchange rate changes. Several years of economic stability and growth
followed the Colombian policy changes."1 '
The Colombian situation exemplifies the dangers of a heavyhanded
approach to policy dialogue. In fact, the sensitivity of participants in pol-
icy negotiations is a key factor in the success of a policy dialogue, which
assumes understanding and acceptance by the recipient government. The
foreign assistance community uniformly agrees that:
External donors .... assume a heavy burden of responsibility when they
intervene vigorously and on a continuing basis in a developing country's
policy formulation. This is not to argue against such intervention ...
external influence may be extremely useful as a counterweight to internal
resistance to needed change, as a supplement to analytic capacity in
countries lacking their own trained analysts, and as a stimulant to fresh
perspectives in more sophisticated countries. But effective use of influ-
ence also demands recognition of the limits of our understanding of de-
velopment problems, the patience to work toward a consensus on goals
and means, and the willingness to stand by the implicit obligations of the
game.1 12
Sensitivity, combined with the donor's knowledge and understanding of
host country conditions, are the prime ingredients for a successful policy
dialogue.
C. Israel: The Successful Use of Policy Dialogue
A recent A.I.D. evaluation of assistance provided to Israel through
A.I.D.'s housing guaranty program illustrates policy dialogue at its best.
In this case, A.I.D. assistance began under the least favorable conditions
for influencing policy reforms. First, Israel was a United States ally with
the highest foreign policy priority, and the Government of Israel was cer-
tainly aware of that fact. Second, Israel's housing policies were well estab-
1' Approaches to the Policy Dialogue, A..D. Policy Paper, August 1982, Annex I, at
A1-2.
112 J. NELSON, A.I.D. INFLUENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY 89-90 (1968).
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lished, highly political and strongly rooted in the traditions and culture of
the country. Certainly they were perceived by the government as being
politically immutable. Finally, neither Israel nor A.I.D. expected A.I.D. to
provide technical assistance or envisioned discussing policy changes at the
time the first housing guaranty agreement was executed. However, even
under these "worst case" conditions, A.I.D.'s seven-year $200 million
housing guaranty program in Israel was a resounding success and led to a
number of policy reforms."1
In order to analyze the elements which determined the success of the
policy dialogue with Israel, it is necessary to understand the policies in
effect when the housing guarantee program began. Housing in Israel was
then and is still the Israeli government's highest priority. Since the crea-
tion of the State of Israel, the budget for the Ministry of Construction
and Housing has been second only to the budget for defense. Israel's
housing policy is based on the fact that the population has increased
more than five-fold since Israel declared its independence in 1948. The
Israeli government continues to produce new housing in order to provide
homes for young couples and in anticipation of the possible large immi-
gration of Russian Jews in the event that the Soviet Union allows them to
emigrate to Israel.
One of Israel's strongest national priorities is to provide homes for all
refugees. Most refugees have been stripped of their possessions by the
countries from which they emigrate and they arrive in Israel without re-
sources. Initially, many immigrants had to be placed in temporary sub-
standard housing. With time and the slowing of the population growth,
the housing standard gradually improved.
Another primary facet of Israel's housing policy is the emphasis on
home ownership. Israel's housing policy strongly encourages people to
buy their apartments and most of the buildings in Israel are condomini-
ums. This policy is an attempt to eradicate a long history of discrimina-
tion where Jews were not allowed to own property. The policy is also
based on the belief that if people own their homes, they have a stake in
the country. Thus, rental housing is generally used only for those persons
who cannot afford to purchase homes even with government assistance.
An additional factor in Israel's housing policy is the overall plan for
promoting orderly and effective development of the country as a whole.
113 The discussion of A.I.D.'s housing guaranty program in Israel is based on an A.LD.
evaluation of the program in which the author participated. After extensive research and
briefings in the United States, the four-member team spent a month in Israel interviewing
government officials, housing contractors, residents in buildings financed through housing
guarantees, economists, bank officials and others. A.I.D. evaluation teams are "independent"
in that they are chosen among A.I.D. personnel who have not been associated with either
the project or office which sponsored it. The results of this evaluation will be published by
A.I.D.
Vol. 15:213
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
The State owns 92 % of the land and exercises tight control over all plan-
ning and development. 114 Israel uses its housing policy to promote growth
in development towns and other strategic regions, such as Jerusalem, the
border towns and the West Bank, and also to discourage development in
such highly populated areas as Tel Aviv and the coastal strip. Although
Israel no longer places its new immigrants in designated areas but allows
them to choose their own locations, housing policy is still used to en-
courage location where the State desires growth.
All of these policies have determined the course of Israeli housing
development and contributed to both the success and problems which ex-
ist today. Israel has been overwhelmingly successful in providing a high
standard of living for its citizens. No one is without a home. On the other
hand, Israel's emphasis on housing construction, rather than on mainte-
nance and rehabilitation, has led to a progressive deterioration of its
housing stock. Moreover, while government control has been successfully
used for the spectacular development of Israel, the government also un-
dertook almost complete responsibility for housing construction which
became a tremendous drain on the Israeli budget.
Initially, the A.I.D. program in Israel was little more than a resource
transfer. The program began in fiscal year 1972 when A.I.D. guaranteed a
$50 million loan, channelled through Tefahot, the Israeli Mortgage Bank,
Ltd., to provide mortgage financing.1 5 Both the United States and Israel
understood that Israel would use the funds to improve its balance of pay-
ments and to increase its housing budget. A.I.D. was not directly involved
in the planning or development of housing units for Israel. However, dur-
ing the course of the relationship with Israel, U.S. influence on Israel's
housing program and housing policies increased.
After legislation was enacted requiring A.I.D. to target its programs
to people below the median income, A.I.D. guarantees on construction
loans to Israel focused on housing for low income families and minorities.
More important, however, a dialogue was established between A.I.D. and
Israeli housing and finance ministry officials on housing problems and a
relationship of trust developed between the countries, resulting in in-
creased A.I.D. influence on Israeli policy. Israeli ministry officials began
to request technical assistance from A.I.D. because they recognized that
the U.S. had successfully resolved some of the housing problems which
Israel faced and because they were impressed by the expertise of A.I.D.
officials and consultants and our willingness to help without imposing un-
solicited conditions. The recommendations made by A.I.D., coupled with
114 Israel Housing and Shelter Improvement Program, A.I.D. Project Paper 271-HG-
006, at 9 (1978).
115 Israel Shelter Upgrading and Housing Program, A.I.D. Project Paper 271-HG-007,
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an analysis of the economic implications of Israeli housing policy, pro-
vided an impetus for changes in Israeli housing policy. These changes in-
cluded new policies which placed greater emphasis on maintenance and
rehabilitation of Israel's existing housing stock; the development of so-
phisticated community renewal projects, combining physical rehabilita-
tion and the provision of social services; and increased emphasis on par-
ticipation by the private sector in Israeli housing.
A.I.D. had a substantial impact on changing Israeli policy in the area
of rental housing maintenance and management. Peter Abeles, an A.I.D.
housing consultant, raised challenging questions with respect to the utili-
zation of the existing housing stock.11 Through these questions, Israeli
officials gained new perspectives on how to manage the existing housing
supply and began to emphasize maintenance and rehabilitation, rather
than focusing exclusively on building new units. The A.I.D. - Israeli dia-
logue led to a larger allocation for housing renovation in subsequent Is-
raeli budgets.
A.I.D. recommendations also led to the strengthening of maintenance
departments in districts throughout Israel. A.I.D. recommended estab-
lishing a local maintenance corporation in each subsidized project.117
Amidar, the Israeli National Housing Corporation for Immigrants, Ltd.
which is responsible for low-income units and is the single largest owner
of rental housing, did not have the resources to establish such a corpora-
tion in each project. However, Amidar was able to decentralize its mainte-
nance operations and establish district offices. According to Amidar offi-
cials, substantial funds were saved because officials in the area were able
to take quicker action with respect to property improvements and main-
tenance.1 s (Due to the high inflation in Israel, even a postponement of
two or three weeks in making repairs or construction alterations could
raise costs 2 to 3 percent.119)
A.I.D.'s technical assistance program also influenced internal policy
changes by exposing Israeli housing officials to successful housing mainte-
nance and management programs in the United States. A.I.D. and Israel
jointly sponsored a visit for housing officials to the United States which
enabled the Israelis to learn sophisticated maintenance and management
techniques from American housing experts. The Israeli officials were able
to apply what they learned to Israel when they returned.
A.I.D. was also successful in encouraging Israeli housing ministry offi-
116 Boone, Young and Associates and Abeles, Schwartz and Associates, Housing Main-
tenance and Management in Israel, Review and Recommendations (Nov. 1977).
117 Id. at 33-39.
218 Israel Shelter Upgrading and Housing Program, supra note 115, at 20.
119 Inflation in Israel hovers around 110 to 150 per cent per year. Vines, Israel, MDDLE
EAST REVIEW (1981).
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cials to create a larger rental housing market, despite some reluctance on
the part of Israeli officials to modify Israel's strong policy in favor of
home ownership. The American recommendations were made on the basis
of high vacancy rates in condominiums in some areas, the difficulty exper-
ienced by Israelis in moving to other cities in Israel, and the fact that,
even with the huge housing subsidies offered by the government, some
Israelis could not afford or did not want to purchase their own units. Al-
though Israeli officials were aware of the arguments for creating some
rental housing, the formal recommendations made by A.I.D. in reports
submitted to the government, as well as our offer to guarantee construc-
tion loans on some of the initial experimental projects, set the stage for
the Israeli government to reach a consensus and agree to a rental housing
experiment at an earlier time than would have occurred without U.S. in-
tervention. The experiment proved to be successful and resulted in an
increase of rental housing units in Israel.
Another area in which A.I.D. technical assistance had a policy impact
was in encouraging the creation of a private sector in the housing con-
struction industry. Again, the impact was not due so much to specific ad-
vice given by A.I.D., but to an experiential learning process resulting from
the continuing dialogue between Israeli government officials through their
discussions with A.I.D. consultants and their analysis of some of the more
successful aspects of our construction industry in the United States.
When A.I.D. began its housing guaranty program to Israel in the
1970's, the Israeli government was the dominant factor in the housing
construction industry. During the course of the A.I.D. - Israeli relation-
ship, A.I.D. experts pointed out that government costs could be cut by
placing more responsibility and risk on the private construction sector.
This dialogue caused the government of Israel to adopt new housing poli-
cies in 1978, which decreased the cost of the subsidy to the government
and increased the financing responsibility of the private contractor. The
new system reduced the government's financial burden and resulted in
earlier completion of construction by the private contractor, because the
contractor assumed a portion of the construction financing risk.120 These
changes reduced the total time for completion of construction from
thirty-four months in 1979 to twenty months in 1981, which substantially
reduced interest costs on construction loans.
At the suggestion of A.I.D., the Israeli government also changed its
mortgage subsidy policy to allow people eligible for government mort-
gages to use those mortgages to purchase apartments in buildings of their
choice, rather than in designated buildings. Once purchasers were allowed
to choose their apartments, they naturally chose those which were better
120 Israel Shelter Upgrading and Housing Program, supra note 115, at 15.
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designed and constructed. The combination of purchaser selection and
the imposition of additional risk on the private contractors weeded out a
large number of ineffective, wasteful contractors and reduced the cost of
construction significantly.
A.I.D. consultants tried to encourage creation of a private sector in
Israeli's housing finance market, but with less success. Consultants hired
by A.I.D. from the American savings and loan industry visited Israel and
made recommendations to the Israeli government over a period of years
urging adoption of a housing finance system based on the American sav-
ings and loan housing finance and secondary market systems.121 Although
Israeli officials were impressed by the achievements of these American
experts in the United States, the Israelis were unable to use the recom-
mendations because the American system is not readily adaptable to
Israel. Israeli financial markets are totally controlled by the government
and, although mortgage institutions exist, these institutions are required
to invest all but a small portion of their deposits in government securities.
Although some Israeli officials believe that reduction in the role of
government in mortgage financing is desirable, they do not believe that
adoption of the United States system as a whole is possible. Israeli offi-
cials were critical of the recommendations made by A.I.D. consultants
and suggested that the recommendations would have been more benefi-
cial if they had been specifically tailored to existing Israeli conditions and
institutions and had been designed to be adopted on a step-by-step basis
over a period of time.12 2 This is an example of a dialogue which was not
successful because we attempted to export an American system without
designing it to meet existing conditions in the recipient countries' econ-
omy and financial markets.
On the other hand, A.I.D. had dramatic success in assisting Israel to
implement a distressed neighborhoods program, or "project renewal," as
it is known in Israel. The program is designed to eliminate slums by ad-
dressing not only the problem of physical deterioration of buildings but a
wide range of socio-economic conditions in the neighborhoods. A major
goal of the program is to develop an awareness of neighborhood residents
of problems and to increase their participation and involvement in find-
ing solutions. 123
The neighborhoods designated as "distressed" are generally urban
and contain a high concentration of underprivileged families. These
neighborhoods have a negative image and are characterized by a high per-
centage of families in dilapidated housing, overcrowding, high crime rates
121 271-HG-005, 1976, financed this study.
122 Interviews with Bank of Israel, Tefahot and Ministry of Finance officials.
122 MINISTRY OF CONSTRUCTION AND HouSING, JERUSALEM, NEIGHBORHOOD REHABILITA-
TION IN ISRAEL 11, 13-14 (Oct. 1977).
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and a low level of neighborhood infrastructure and community services.124
When A.I.D. began its participation in this program, only 11 neighbor-
hoods were involved. These neighborhoods were chosen because they were
the worst in terms of substandard living conditions, physical and organi-
zational infrastructure and other social factors. A.I.D. influenced the dis-
tressed neighborhoods program both through technical assistance and the
provision of funds. Although some Israeli ministry officials had been ad-
vocating creation of a program to rehabilitate distressed neighborhoods,
American financial support and technical assistance expedited adoption
of the program by the Israeli government.
In 1978, A.I.D. provided a loan guaranty of $7 million to be used for
the physical rehabilitation component of the project.1 25 Although A.I.D.'s
monetary participation in this program was small, the $7 million was a
major portion of the Israeli budget for the program at the time and
A.I.D.'s participation acted as a catalyst for obtaining greater Israeli gov-
ernment commitment to the program as a whole. The program was so
successful that, in 1980, the government of Israel expended $61 million to
expand the effort which will eventually refurbish 160 neighborhoods. This
is an example of the type of incentive A.I.D. can use to promote major
policy changes through assistance programs.
The changes in Israeli housing policy which resulted from the dia-
logue between A.I.D. and Israeli Housing Ministry officials are examples
of the positive use of development assistance to induce internal policy
reforms. Our assistance relationship with Israel is a model for the type of
policy dialogue which the United States should follow in other assistance
efforts. The Israeli experience was successful because the dialogue was
based on a relationship of trust and mutual respect; in no case did Ameri-
can officials attempt to force changes or ideas which were unwanted or
unworkable. A.I.D. gave the Israelis the opportunity to become exposed
to methods and technology which had worked successfully in our own
housing construction and finance industry. We provided experts who, for
the most part, were leaders in United States industry and were also famil-
iar with the Israeli system and able to adapt our methods to it. In those
instances where recommendations were not based on the realities of the
Israeli situation, such as in housing finance, they failed. Where, through a
continuing dialogue, recommendations were made in an effort to promote
the efficiency of the program, and those efforts were recognized as such
by the Israelis, policy changes occurred which went far beyond the initial
expectations of A.I.D. officials.
Although Israel's economy and technology are clearly more advanced
than those of many developing countries, the basic principles of the dia-
124 Id. at 9.
"' Israel Housing and Shelter Improvement Program, supra note 114, at 19.
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logue and relationship which resulted between our two countries is cer-
tainly transferable to programs in other countries. The recipe for success
is a thorough understanding by A.I.D. officials of problems and conditions
in the recipient country and a willingness to work with the country in
order to solve development problems, without imposing solutions. The
role of A.I.D. should be one of advocacy of policy changes, of exposing the
recipient country to models and examples of policies which have worked
successfully in the United States and elsewhere, and of providing oppor-
tunities for recipient countries to experiment by financing projects which
the countries might be otherwise unable to undertake. The Israeli experi-
ence demonstrates that the dialogue can work successfully and we should
attempt to replicate this experience wherever we can in our assistance
program. This experience also shows the benefits of using persuasion as
opposed to force or threats.
V. CONCLUSION
A wide variety of policies - political, economic, social and develop-
mental - must be considered in order to make the most effective use of
foreign assistance as a foreign policy tool. It is clearly in the best interests
of the United States to develop foreign assistance programs which foster
our basic philosophies of humanitarian concerns, encouragement of demo-
cratic institutions and promotion of economic stability and self-suffi-
ciency in developing countries. At times, however, the proliferation of
specific prohibitions and mandates continually added by amendments to
the Foreign Assistance Act hamper the flexibility needed by A.I.D. to re-
tain the flexibility necessary to respond quickly and effectively to chang-
ing world needs, whether caused by natural disasters or military coups.
We have seen how the concept of policy dialogue is used to address indi-
vidual conditions in recipient countries in order to increase the impact of
development assistance programs. This concept is effective because it is
not expressly delimited by statute or regulation and can thus be tailored
to deal with unique problems and situations. Our foreign assistance pro-
gram can be most effective when it is most flexible. The number of legis-
lative restrictions should be kept to a minimum in order to encourage
creativity and innovative solutions to the ever-changing challenges of the
developing world.
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